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Abstract: This paper examines the negative externalities that may occur when a large bank fails, describes 
the nature of those externalities, and explores whether they may be greater in a case involving a large 
cross-border banking organization. The analysis suggests that the chief negative externalities are 
associated with credit losses and losses due to liquidity problems, and these losses are critically affected 
by how promptly an insolvent institution is closed, how quickly depositors gain access to their funds, and 
how long it takes borrowers to reestablish credit relationships. While regulatory delay and forbearance 
may affect the size and distribution of losses, the likely incident of systemic risk and the negative 
externalities are more associated with the structure of the applicable bankruptcy laws and methods 
available to resolve a failed institution and quickly get it operating again. This circumstance implies that 
regulatory concerns about systemic risk should be directed first at closing institutions promptly, reforming 
bankruptcy statutes to admit special procedures for handling bank failures, and providing mechanisms to 
give creditors and borrowers prompt and immediate access to their funds and lines of credit.  
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A recent trend around the world beginning in the early 2000’s has been the 
production of financial stability reports designed to communicate and evaluate the health 
of individual country financial systems.  Virtually every major central bank, except the 
Federal Reserve and Bank of Italy, are now publishing stability reports on a regular basis. 
These reports evaluate developments in financial markets and across various types of 
financial institutions that may affect the health of financial systems
1.  However, these 
reports have had little to say about the risks that are beginning to evolve related to 
changes in the banking structures themselves, such as the expansion of banking 
organization across country borders.    
To date, the risks associated with multinational banking have been the focus of 
banking supervisors whose primary concern is that the failure of a large multinational 
banking organization might result in systemic risks that threaten the solvency of other 
banking organizations or the health of financial markets.  This paper attempts to do two 
things.  First, it drills down to consider exactly what these systemic risks are.  Second, it 
attempts to examine whether there is anything special about cross-border banking and 
how problems in a large banking organization may be resolved should it experience 
financial difficulties that might either exacerbate or moderate systemic risk concerns.   
                                                 
1 See, for example, International Monetary Fund (2006), Norges Bank (2006), Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand(2006), Banco de Espana(2006), Bank of England(2006) for examples.  For a review of these 
reports see Oosterloo, Haan and Jong-A-Pin (2006). 
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Sources and Nature of Systemic Risks 
 While central banks and regulators are concerned with limiting systemic, the exact 
nature of those risks are and how they can adversely affect financial markets or the real 
economy are not always spelled out in sufficient detail to be amenable to analysis.   
Without a specific enumeration of the problems, it is difficult to evaluate alternative 
policies and regulatory efforts to control them.   
In the theoretical literature systemic risk concerns have typically focused on Great 
Depression-style bank runs.
2     Diamond-Dybvig’s model describes when participating in 
a run and suspension of convertibility of deposits represent optimal depositor and bank 
behavior.  But it does not explain what triggers that run, which simply emerges 
exogenously.  Furthermore, since there is only one bank in the Diamond-Dybig world, a 
run on a bank is in fact a run on the banking system.  How a run on one bank in a 
multiple-bank banking system gets propagated into a run on many banks is not examined.   
The supervisory concern about a flight to currency from deposits resulting from 
uncertainty about the health of one bank is that it could spill over to healthy banks.   In 
this sense, a currency run on a single bank could quickly become contagious. The result 
would be a cumulative collapse in the deposit money supply as deposits are exchanged 
for currency and withdrawn from the banking system.    The sudden and unanticipated 
withdrawal of funds could bring down even a solvent bank if it didn’t have sufficient 
funds on hand to meet the demand, thereby creating a liquidity problem.   
                                                 
2  See Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Kaufman(1988), Chari and Jagannanthan(1988), Chari(1989), 
Jacklin(1987), Jacklin and Bhattacharya(1988), and Wallace(1988, 1990)   3
Theoretical work extending this liquidity component as a propagator of a banking 
crisis relies upon a shock to aggregate output that lowers expected returns on assets.  This 
creates a system wide liquidity crisis and collapse of asset values.
3     Because early 
liquidation of banking assets is costly, intervention by the central bank though its lender 
of last resort function and/or through open market operations has been justified.
4  
Importantly, intervention in such a case is not designed to stem the runs but rather to 
prevent the decline in asset values (Allen and Gale(1998)). 
Despite the large volume of theoretical work, the basic causes of runs and liquidity 
crises in banking and sources of the shocks to information about bank soundness or to 
asset values remain largely unexplained.  Researchers who have attempted to do so have 
argued a) that banks were unstable (See Minsky(1975) or Chari(1989), b) that depositors 
are irrational,  or c) that information about bank asset values is asymmetric and not 
uniformly available to all market participants, making it both difficult to distinguish 
among good and bad firms and rational for depositors to withdraw their funds.
5  
However, none of these explanations are particularly satisfying.   Lastly, another body of 
work has evolved from the Real Business Cycle literature suggests that such shocks are 
simply a natural byproduct of the business cycle and thus, what remains is to limit the 
damage.   
More recently, those that have taken a market (or macro) view of crises look to 
liquidity problems in particular financial or product markets rather than to problems in 
                                                 
3 See Gorton(1988) 
4 See Allen and Gale(1998) whose model generates a run without a first come first served assumption.  See 
also Schoenmaker and Oosterloo(2005) who specifically examine the potential contagion concerns within 
the EU.  Boot(2006) provides a discussion of some of this literature.   
5 See Rochet(2004).   4
individual institutions.
6     Theoretical work in this area has focused on episodes like the 
US stock market decline in 1987 or the Asian, Mexican and Latin American crises which 




While we have still not gained a good understanding of the causes of either financial 
crises or contagion for banks or in financial markets more generally, two conclusions do 
flow from this work.  First, studies of individual crises suggest that problems in the real 
side tend to lead rather than result from financial crises.  Second, once a financial crisis 
does occur, it can sometimes amplify or feed back to the real side, making problems there 
worse.  However, neither the theoretical work nor empirical work helps to understand 
why some market may implode while others may not.   
Despite these short comings, however, history is filled with various examples of 
financial crises and governments and central banks have typically stepped in to limit 
supposed negative externalities they may involve.  It is important, at least in the case of 
banking, to understand exactly what these negative externalities are before one can 
evaluate proposals to deal with them or assess whether certain regulatory arrangements 
may dampen or perhaps exacerbate these externalities when a crisis emerges.  
Negative externalities and banking failures
10 
                                                 
6 Allen and Gale(2000) have provided a modeling framework that attempts to explain how a shock to one 
sector of an economy or financial market may become contagious and spread to other sectors. 
7 Schwartz(1998) argues that it is questionable whether there is evidence of country contagion similar to 
that feared in the bank contagion literature.  Indeed, she argues that imprudent fiscal policies and 
inattention to reform of insolvent banking systems were the cause of financial problems.  Meltzer(1998) 
argues that Asian crises in 1997 reflected moral hazard behavior that had it roots in IMF and governmental 
bailout responses to the 1995 crisis in Mexico. 
8 See Chang and Velasco(2000),(2001), Champ, Smith and Williamson(1996) for examples.  
9 Contrary to what some have asserted, the Federal Reserve did not provide central bank funds but simply 
provided a meeting place for counterparties and creditors of LTCM to meet and work out an acceptable 
restructuring. 
10 This section draws heavily on and may repeat material from Eisenbeis and Kaufman(2005, 2006) and 
Wall and Eisenbeis(1999).   5
Understanding the negative externalities associated with banking crises requires 
identification of the affected parties are and how they are impacted.
11   When a bank 
cannot pay out all its debts, including deposits in full and on time, it goes into default, 
losses will be incurred, and the resolution process to allocate those losses and dispose of 
the failed bank must begin.  Insured depositors will be paid, and uninsured depositors and 
other creditors will share in the losses according to their legal priority with equity holders 
may receiving any residual values if any remain.   
During the resolution process, claimants may experience both credit and liquidity 
losses.  The size and duration of those losses depend critically on the nature of the 
resolution processes and legal arrangements in place.  Credit losses to debt holders and 
depositors may occur when the recovery value of the bank, as a whole, or in parts falls 
short of the par value of its debts on their respective due dates.  In the case of uninsured 
depositors, for example, losses are a function of not only the size of the claim, but also 
whether depositors are allowed to offset any deposit claims against any loans they may 
owe to the bank before sharing in any pro-rata claims.  In the case of collateralized 
deposits, the ability to avoid losses depends upon the legal status of the collateral claims 
and where the collateral is held.  Of course, collateralization of deposits, like discount 
window borrowing, creates a preferred liability in that payment is tied to the value of 
high quality assets - usually the highest quality assets that the bank has, such as Treasury 
obligations.  This also means that the pledged assets would not be available to meet the 
claims of other depositors who then have to rely on recovering from the liquidation of 
lower quality assets, thereby increasing the probability that they will incur losses.  
                                                 
11 In the US, for example, the banking supervisor determines that a bank is insolvent and should be closed, 
but the triggering event is when the Federal Reserve presents a cash letter to the bank that can’t be paid.  In 
other countries, the triggering event is typically when a payment to a private customer can’t be made.   6
Liquidity losses may occur for four reasons.  First, depositors may not have 
immediate (next business day or so) and full access to the par value of their insured 
claims or to the estimated recovery value of their de jure uninsured claims.  Delays in 
access to funds could force depositors to liquidate other assets or cause them to default on 
loans to other creditors, including suppliers if they don’t have other assets to sell.   
Second, qualified borrowers may not be able to utilize their existing credit lines 
immediately.  Those with no established substitutes could experience business disruption, 
loss of access to working capital, or be forced to default on obligations. Third, there may 
be both liquidity problems and ultimately credit losses associated with payment and 
settlement system failures when a problem in one institution is transmitted via the 
payments system to others who are awaiting payments but that can’t be settled because of 
the failure of the bank counter party.
12   Fourth, with the growth of derivative and swap 
markets, the failure of a major player in those markets would disrupt hedges and force 
counterparties to re-establish their positions.  Some may not be able to do so, and the 
priority of contingent claims in bankruptcy is not always clear.   Thus the failure of a 
bank that was also a major counterparty in derivatives markets might have negative 
spillovers to other market participants, increasing their risk exposures and the cost of both 
credit to borrowers and liability issuance to financial institutions.
13  
The potential for disruption to derivatives markets was the concern in the case of 
LTCM.  Now, it is debatable whether and what type of government or central bank 
intervention would be appropriate in such cases and whether that intervention would be 
justified if the troubled institution was a bank as opposed to some other type of financial 
                                                 
12 See Schoenmaker and Oosterloo(2005).  
13 Mengle (2006) argues that actions have been taken in an attempt to provide private sector solutions to 
this problem.    7
firm.  In the LTCM case, the Federal Reserve only brought LTCM together with its 
creditors who resolved LTCM without use of government or central bank funds.   It was 
also the case that prompt resolution by its major creditors did avoid serious disruptions to 
the markets in which LTCM was a major player.  Furfine(2006) has demonstrated 
through exploration of Fedwire data that there is no evidence that counterparties to 
LTCM experience liquidity problems during the episode.  Whether central bank funds 
would have been involved or whether, had the same factual circumstances existed for a 
large bank, it would have been permitted to borrow at the discount window is an 
interesting question to be explored.
14   
The extent of these liquidity and credit costs to depositors and borrowers, and the 
secondary spillovers to their creditors and customers determine the negative externalities 
and social costs of the failure.  Clearly, the larger the institution, the greater and more 
complex are the linkages to other institutions and markets.  These linkages increase the 
chance that negative externalities associated with their failure might have undesirability 
spillover effects to other markets and institutions.   
Experience suggests that that both the legal and regulatory structure may generate 
both conflicts of interest and agency costs resulting in forbearance or delay in resolving 
troubled institutions causing credit and liquidity problems.  Moreover, these negative 
externalities may be exacerbated when cross-border banking organizations experience 
financial difficulties.   
 
                                                 
14 Both markets and regulators do learn from dealing with large troubled institutions, and may be less prone 
to intervene after the first major case has occurred.   Recently, for example, the reported loss by the large 
hedge fund Amaranth Advisors of over $6 billion, or nearly 65% of its assets, from taking positions in 
energy derivatives caused scarcely a ripple in financial markets, nor was there a call for intervention.  See 
Sender(2006)   8
Conflicts of interest, agency costs and bankruptcy laws: their role in affecting the 
negative externalities of banking failures 
 
The responsible agencies often are subject to agency costs or conflicts of interest 
that can incent them to engage in forbearance buy delaying the closure of insolvent 
institutions or to delay resolving institutions once they have been legally closed and this 
can increase credit losses.
 15   Liquidity problems can be increased if there are legal or 
other impediments to prompt resolution, closure, recapitalization and return to operations 
of large banking organizations that have failed.  
Credit losses are most likely to arise when conflicts adversely affect the incentives 
of regulators to act promptly to deal with problems as they arise.  Self interest and 
incentive problems of the classical principle/agent type exist between and among banking 
supervisors and taxpayers usually result in delay.   The reason is that regulators have 
incentives to pursue policies that preserve their agencies and protect their turf and self 
interest.  These incentives lead to a “not-on-my-watch” mentality and lead to regulatory 
gambling that the agency can “work out the problem or aid in restoring troubled 
institutions to solvency.”  It is perceived to be better not to have major institutions fail if 
you are the regulator and responsible at the time the failure occurs.  Agency preservation 
provides incentives to ensure that problems are “worked out” rather than result in the 
closer of a major institution.  Institution failure, given that the supervisor is charged with 
surveillance and intervention when problems arise, can quickly be interpreted by outside 
parties as an agency failure or, in the case of the person in charge, a leadership failure.  
                                                 
15 Horvitz(1983) discussed the problems that overlapping regulatory structure may involve specifically in 
the context of financial regulation of U.S. banking. He suggested that policies may be interpreted, applied 
and implemented differently and jurisdictional conflicts might arise between the regulatory agencies over 
the form, substance, and implementation of regulations.  The range of policy areas with possible goals that 
may be subject to possible conflicts for bank regulators includes: consumer protection (for both retail and 
wholesale customers), monetary policy, community development, investor protection, market transparency, 
safety and soundness, ensuring the safety net, reducing systemic risk, and antitrust. See also Kane(2000).   9
Either or both reinforce incentives of regulators to pursue their own private self-interest 
and to maintain their agency’s reputation in order to protect their own jobs and future 
marketability and employment in the banking industry.
16   These conflicts may lead to 
more accommodating policies in the form of lower than appropriate capital requirements 
and to regulatory forbearance when institutions get in trouble, thereby shifting risk and 
any associated costs to taxpayers and/or the deposit insurance fund as regulators attempt 
to ingratiate themselves with constituent banks.   
An example of such delay, despite the Federal Deposit Insurance corporation 
Improvement Act’s ( FDICIA) early intervention and prompt corrective action mandate, 
was seen recently in the problems surrounding the handling of the failure of Superior 
Bank whose failure cost its insurance fund an estimated $763 million or about 40% of the 
institution’s assets.
17   A recent GAO report found several problems with the supervision 
and handling of this institution by Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)  including: failure 
to recognize warning signs that the institution was engaged in risky behavior many years 
before its failure; lack of cooperation and coordination with the FDIC who sought to 
exercise its right to examine the institution when its analysis suggested that the institution 
was engaging in excessively risky strategies, problems with the accounting which 
interfered with proper functioning of prompt corrective action (PCA), questionable 
findings by the institution’s external auditors concerning accounting practices, undue 
reliance by OTS on the belief that the owners who where both prominent and wealthy 
individuals would not let the institution fail, and delays on the part of the FDIC to 
                                                 
16 See Kane (1991,1989, 2006), Schüler (2003), and Lewis (1997) 
17 See Office of Inspector General (2002).     10
promptly resolve the failure in the hopes that principals would provide additional 
capital.
18   
While there were numerous breakdowns in the supervisory process, two key 
features of US law and banking regulation prevented the failure from having negative 
externalities on customers, depositors or financial markets.   The first was the existence 
of special bankruptcy laws that enabled the institution to be closed by the regulators.  The 
second was resolution policies that permitted the FDIC to transfer assets and liabilities 
immediately to a newly chartered Federal Savings Bank and to serve as conservator until 
it was subsequently re-privatized through sale to another banking organization.
19   This 
enabled insured depositors to have continuous and immediate access to their funds and 
causing little disruption to borrowers.
20   It is these two features – a special bankruptcy 
law and authority of the regulator to close a trouble institution – if exercised so as to 
provide depositors and borrows immediate access to their funds and borrowers access to 
credit that are key to minimizing negative externalities associated with banking failures.  
Borrowers and creditors know with certainty that they will have immediate access to their 
resources and thus the incentive to engage in a run, for example, is minimized and 
failures become isolated events.  Agency problems and goal conflicts, to the extent that 
they provide incentives for regulators to engage in forbearance, increases the losses that 
                                                 
18 GAO(2002) and Johnson(2005).  
19 In a bank failure, the FDIC was given authority in 1987 under the Competitive Equity and Banking Act 
to create a bridge (or temporary) bank to facilitate the resolution of the failed entity while enabling 
depositors to have access to their funds.  Functionally, this process is similar to that used in the Superior, 
FSB case where the FDIC lacked authority to create a bridge federal savings bank.  For a detailed 
discussion and comparison of bankruptcy processes for banks as compared to non-banks see Bliss and 
Kaufman(2006) 
20 To be sure there were law suits filed against the auditors, but the case was dismissed and uninsured 
depositors lost funds.    11
the taxpayer and deposit insurance funds may have to bear, but do not in all 
circumstances increase the negative externalities to bank customers of a failure.   
Cross-border banking arrangements raise additional issues and considerations 
which suggest that the risks of negative externalities may be greater should a large, cross-
border institution fail.
21   Likely externalities depend on not only the relative importance 
of the activities in the home country relative to the host country, but also on whether 
cross-border banking takes place through branches or though separately chartered 
subsidiaries.   For example, if a large banking organization has a very large share of the 
banking business in the host country, but not in the home country, and it fails, there could 
be substantial disruptions to both banking and commerce in the host country if customers 
don’t have ready access to their funds, but there might be little impact on customers of 
markets in the home country.
22  
Deciding when to close the institution, for example, may not only affect the 
availability of funds, but also may determine the incident of loss.  For example, in the 
failure of Herstadt Bank, the home country German authorities decided to close the bank 
during the middle of the banking day, such that certain foreign exchange transactions 
hadn’t totally settled.
23  While the closure policy did not affect the fact that losses had 
occurred, it did affect which parties bore the loss.  This case illustrates the dilemma the 
regulators may face in weighing the consequences for the customers and economies of 
                                                 
21 See Schüler and Heinemann(2005). 
22 The relative shares of banking organizations in Europe, for example, suggest just this kind of concern.  In 
Estonia, foreign banking organizations control 98% of the banking assets and in at least 8 of the 25 EU 
countries, out of country banks control 50% or more of the banking assets.  See Eisenbeis and 
Kaufman(2006)and Schoenmaker and Laecke (2006).  Lindgren(2006) suggests that the failure of Meridien 
Bank BIAO in Africa in 1995 was an example of negative cross-border externalities associated with the 
failure of that institution. 
23 In particular, for certain mark-dollar settlements, the mark side of the transaction had settled, but the 
dollar payments were not due to settle until later in the day after the institution had closed.  This meant that 
dollar claimants were put into a potential loss position.   12
different countries of alternative regulatory and supervisory policies and especially 
decisions when to close troubled institutions and when to invoke lender-of-last resort or 
emergency lending to provide additional liquidity to markets and institutors.
24   
Divided loyalties and conflicts may lead banking supervisors and regulators of 
troubled banking organizations to prefer resolutions that favor their own citizens and to 
operate in what they consider is the best interest of their country, however defined or 
perceived (see Herring (2006) and Bollard (2005)).
25  Logically, the incentives of the 
regulators, deposit insurance provider and/or failure resolution entity are typically aligned 
with the residents of the regulators’ home rather than with the interests of all customers in 
the whole market or geographic area within which the institution operates.  Thus, it seems 
inevitable that negative externalities that may result from a large cross-border banking 
failure will be shifted to host countries rather than imposed upon home countries. 
As foreign banking organizations’ market share of host country assets increases 
through merger or acquisition host country regulators face two problems, both of which 
deal with problems of access to information.   When expansion takes place through 
branching and acquisitions, host country regulators face not only a loss of constituents to 
supervise and regulate, but also, if the host country is responsible for lender of last resort 
functions, then lending to the branch of a troubled bank that they don’t supervise faces 
                                                 
24 Provisions of FDICIA changed the rules in an attempt to eliminate Herstadt problems for U.S. banks.  It 
essentially gave priority in bankruptcy to netting arrangements among banks over all other claimants. 
25  This problem has arisen in France with the country’s attempt to preserve Credit Lyonnais with injections 
of governmental funds in more than three separate instances in the past several years.  More recently, an 
editorial in the Wall Street Journal Europe (2005) entitled “Spaghetti Banking” pointed out that the 
governor of the Bank of Italy had refused to approve the acquisition of a single Italian bank by a foreign 
institution for the last 12 years.  The governor indicated his desire to “… preserve the banks’ Italianness 
also in the future ….”  This protectionism was challenged by the European Union’s Internal Market 
Commission in connection with the proposed acquisitions of two Italian banks by ABN Amro and Banco 
Bilbao Vizcaya Argentina, and the governor of the central bank was ultimately forced out amid criminal 
investigations associated with the blockage of the proposed transactions.   
   13
the central bank (or lender of last resort) with the prospect of having to rely upon the 
home country for information on the solvency of the bank.  In the EU, agreements have 
been struck that vest primary supervisory and regulatory responsibility for a banking 
organization with the country in which an institution is chartered.  Branches come under 
the responsibility of the home country as does umbrella supervisory authority for banking 
organizations with multiple independently chartered subsidiaries.   
In contrast, when expansion takes place through separately chartered subsidiaries, 
the information problem is a bit different.  Supervision and regulation responsibility for 
the subsidiaries lie with the countries in which they are chartered, but the information 
gleaned about the subsidiary may not adequately reflect its true risk position if the parent, 
for example, is experiencing financial difficulties or the subsidiary is operationally 
dependant for management or operational support from the parent or its other 
subsidiaries.  Again, the true financial risks can only be determined with adequate sharing 
of information between the home and host countries of the parent and the subsidiaries 
(Committee on the Global Financial System, 2004).
26   Without adequate and timely 
information, the host country may be in a poor position to assess the potential risks or 
externalities its citizens and economy may be exposed to from its foreign branches. These 
incentive conflicts may be especially acute in host countries with a large foreign banking 
presence.   
The logistics and costs to host country regulators of quickly accessing information 
on these arrangements, or even finding it, can be daunting, even when the foreign 
                                                 
26 Differences in quality can exist simply because countries fund their banking regulators differently or 
because they have had only limited experience in supervising market entities. Schüler (2003) argues that 
this problem of information access issue constitutes a form of agency problem between the home and host 
country regulator.     14
banking organization enters by way of a bank subsidiary rather than a branch.  Should a 
foreign-owned institution become insolvent and be legally closed, it may not be possible 
to keep those portions of the institution’s operations in the host country physically open 
and operating seamlessly during the resolution process in an attempt to limit any adverse 
consequences that may accrue to deposit and loan customers.  The necessary senior 
management, operating records, and computer facilities may be physically located in the 
home rather than in the host countries or in separately owned and operated affiliates and 
subsidiaries in third countries.  For these reasons, regulatory oversight and discipline is 
likely to be more difficult and less effective in host countries with a substantial foreign 
bank presence than in countries without this presence.  The resolution process is also less 
effective.   
Perception of these problems is likely to heighten incentives on the part of host 
country regulators to seek to protect their own citizens through ring-fencing of assets, 
even at the expense of host country citizens. 
27  However, attempts to engage in ring 
fencing may be of little value.  With so many assets now being in electronic form or 
booked in other locations, it may be impossible to actually get hold of the assets.  At best, 
the main benefit of ring fencing may to be to establish legal claim to certain assets that 
would have to be settled in international courts, a process that could prove difficult and 
time consuming and adding to the negative externalities that may result. 
                                                 
27 New Zealand has addressed this issue by requiring that subsidiaries be structured in such a way that if 
the parent becomes insolvent, solvent subsidiaries can be operated effectively without interruption in terms 
of capabilities and management.  This doesn’t seem to be a practical solution for large multi-national 
banking organizations on a broad scale since this may deny these institutions the economies of scale and 
scope and risk management.     
   15
Adding to potential depositor confusion and information asymmetries is the fact 
that two banking organizations headquartered in different host countries may be subject 
to different bankruptcy procedures; to different policies concerning the timely availability 
of funds in the event of a bankruptcy; and even different policies as to whether deposits 
in foreign branches are or are not insured.  The U.S., for example, doesn’t insure the 
foreign deposits in offshore branches of US banks, but may insure the deposits in the 
branches of foreign institutions operating in the US.    
With respect to the international dimension to the agency problem, home country 
regulators may take insufficient account of how the externalities that a failure, and the 
way that it is resolved, may affect the host country. That is, because all the regulators in 
countries in which a banking organization operates may have different objective 
functions and incentives, they may not all be pulling in the same direction at the same 
time with respect to prudential supervision and regulation.  And these conflicts may be 
important, even when there exist coordinating bodies or agreements and understandings 
as to principles.
28   Even when there is a statutory mandate for regulators with 
overlapping responsibilities to cooperate, agency problems sometimes prevent this from 
happening.  When cooperation breaks down, as it is most likely to do when a crisis arises 
and real money is at stake, agency self interest often trumps even the law.  This is more 
likely to happen when agreements lack even the force of law, and there is no way to 
enforce agreements that may have been made ex ante.    Regulators may take conflicting 
                                                 
28 Schüler(2003) indicates that in Europe, for example, that there were over 90 memoranda of 
understanding (MoU’s) in Europe as of 1999 governing the exchange of information and commitments for 
handling troubled institutions.  With the addition of the accession countries 300 bilateral arrangements need 
to be put in place for handling troubled institutions, and this may not cover the needed information sharing 
when a bank operates in more than two EU countries.  The two main problems with these MoUs are that 
they are secret, so the depositors have no information as to how they might be treated, and that these MoUs 
rely upon “soft law” for enforcement and can be disavowed at any time.  See also Boot (2006).    16
actions to benefit their own country’s residents or institutions, say, with respect to the 
nature and timing of any sanctions imposed on a bank for poor performance, the timing 
of any official declaration of insolvency and the associated legal closing of the bank, the 
resolution of the insolvency, or the timing and amount of payment to insured and 
uninsured depositors.
29 
30   
  From the home country perspective, the incentives are not only to pay less 
attention to the externalities that failure may impose on host countries, but also to protect 
home country residents from possible costs of failure.  These incentives may be 
especially significant with respect to the provision of deposit insurance, which is one of 
the main tools designed to assure and protect depositors in the event that a bank gets into 
financial difficulty.  However, the structure of the deposit insurance system, deposit 
insurance coverage, and how the guarantee system is funded can significantly affect 
incentives and may introduce potential conflicts between regulators, who may or may not 
have the authority to close banks, the legal system governing the declaration of 
bankruptcy and the resolution of failed institutions, and distribution, size and sharing of 
loss burden.   
  Consider first the issue of the declaration of bankruptcy and how that affects 
losses.  The longer an insolvent institution is kept open, the greater the losses are that 
both uninsured creditors and the deposit insurance scheme must absorb.  If a regulator 
has the closure responsibility, and engages in forbearance, then the regulator is one of the 
main sources of loss (risk) to uninsured creditors and the deposit insurance fund.  On the 
                                                 
29  A classic case of just such a decision occurred in the Herstadt Bank failure.    
30 In the US, such conflicts have existed among state regulators and among federal banking regulators 
despite a national mandate to coordinate regulatory and supervisory policies and the existence of the 
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council.     17
other hand, if an economically insolvent institution legally must keep operating until it 
can no longer meet a payment obligation, then the bankruptcy law and not the regulator 
affects the amount of the losses that exist.  Ironically, in the US, while the closure 
decision is the responsibility of the regulator (the chartering agent), the losses are born by 
depository institutions who must ex post recapitalize their fund.  But the institutions at 
risk have no oversight responsibilities for evaluating regulatory performance.  That is, the 
regulator is not accountable to the institutions that must bear the risk of lack of 
performance.  If the deposit insurance scheme is publicly funded, as it has been in the 
past in the US and is in many other countries, then deficiencies in the fund must be born 
by the taxpayer.  And here, there is not always clear that the taxpayer will step up, even if 
there is an implicit, let alone explicit responsibility to do so.  There are many instances, 
such as the State of Ohio, where taxpayers reneged on their implicit guarantees and their 
deposit insurance system failed.
31  The likelihood of taxpayers not living up to their 
guarantees is directly linked to the size of the losses.  It is hard to imagine countries like 
Luxembourg or the Netherlands incurring large fiscal debts to honor claims of a 
significant number of depositors located in other EU countries.  Of course, if deposit 
insurance guarantees are not honored, then not only may losses be incurred by both 
insured and uninsured creditors, but they may also experience significant liquidity 
problems as well.   
  Finally, the nature of deposit insurance coverage may also impose negative 
externalities in cross-border situations.  For example, not only does the US deposit 
insurance system not cover deposits in foreign branches of US banks but also the deposit 
insurance fund stands ahead of uninsured creditors in terms of priority of claims to 
                                                 
31 See Eisenbeis and Kaufman(2006).   18
recovered assets.  Hence the failure of a large and significant US institution with 
branches in another country that may have a large share of the market would put the 
depositors of that branch into limbo until the failure is resolved.
32     Similarly, uninsured 
depositors would also suffer liquidity and credit losses.   For US banks, these externality 
risks are not large, because the failure of a large bank is intended be resolved promptly, 
and both insured and uninsured creditors should have prompt access to most of their 
funds.
33   In Europe, and many other countries, it is much less certain as to how 
depositors may fair if a large cross border banking organization were to fail.  First, there 
are no special bankruptcy provisions in most EU countries for bank failures, so resolution 
depends upon the courts.
34  Second, most laws don’t require immediate access to funds.  
Third, while deposits in branches of other EU countries are covered, they typically aren’t 
in branches in non-Eu countries.  
Probably the least explored set of issues in the literature are the negative 
externalities associated with market disruptions that involve liquidity or other problems 
in international debt or equity markets.  The sudden breakdown of financial markets, for 
example, might have both domestic and international consequences, and it is not at all 
clear who or under what circumstances governmental intervention might either be 
justified or occur.  Clearly, central bank intervention can incur through either use of the 
discount window, as was done following the September 11
th terrorism attack in the US, 
or through broad based open market operations.  Similarly, a rescue package was also put 
together to deal with the problem that occurred in Mexico.  International organizations 
                                                 
32 Again, when the branch in the host country is significant in size, there would be a strong temptation to 
engage in ring fencing of assets, which is what the U.S. did in the failure of BCCI. 
33  See Kaufman(2004) for a detailed discussion of how US bank failures typically are resolved now.   
34 For a discussion see Lastra (2006).   19
such as the World Bank or IMF have also stepped in to deal with problems in individual 
countries.  But with the internationalization and cross border ownership of exchanges and 
spread of derivatives markets, the potential for financial disruptions seem to have become 
greater and potentially more significant.
35   
A related issue concerns recent developments in world payments systems and the 
finality rules in real time gross settlement systems (RTGS) in which settlement payments 
are made in central bank funds and once accepted into the system are final.  Under 
Fedwire, for example, payments initiated into the system are guaranteed by the Fed as 
final, which interposes a central bank between counterparties.   New arrangements in the 
clearing and settlement of foreign exchange transactions involve involving a private 
sector solution to the Herstadt problem through a consortium of banks that created CLS 
bank.  Work has just begun exploring the implications that these arrangements may have 
for systemic risk issues.  A concern is that because CLS settles using central bank funds, 
the effect is to link payments systems together in ways that failures may require liquidity 
to be provided by central banks in ways that are both difficult to predict.
36  Moreover, to 
the extent that central banks defacto must provide such credit to avoid meltdowns, 





                                                 
35 Lindgren(2006) found little evidence of cross-border contagion in his examination of recent financial 
crises.  
36 For discussions see Kahn and Roberds(2000), Kahn and Roberds(2006), and the references therein. 
37 See Fujiki, Green and Yamazaki(2006).   20
Summary and conclusions 
 
This paper has attempted to examine the issues surrounding the negative externalities 
that may occur when a large bank fails, to describe the nature of those externalities and to 
determine whether they are greater in a case involving a large cross-border banking 
organization.  The analysis suggests that the chief negative externalities are associated 
with credit risk and losses of liquidity and these losses are critically affected by how 
promptly an insolvent institution is closed, how quickly depositors gain access to their 
funds, and how long it takes borrowers to re-establish credit relationships.  While 
regulatory delay and forbearance may affect the size and distribution of losses, the likely 
incident of systemic risk and the negative externalities are more associated with the 
structure of the applicable bankruptcy laws and methods available to resolve a failed 
institution and quickly get it operating again.  The assumption here is that a large 
organization will not be liquidated but instead must be promptly reorganized, 
recapitalized and re-privatized in order to limit the externalities that the failure may bring 
with it.   The analysis also suggests that, while agency conflicts and goal conflicts among 
the responsible regulators, deposit insurance funds and taxpayers may increase the size of 
potential losses, as was the case for a large domestic-only institution, the incident of 
negative externalities are more determined by the bankruptcy and resolution policies that 
are in place.  This implies that regulatory concerns about systemic risk should be directed 
first at closing institutions promptly, at reforming bankruptcy statues to admit special 
procedures for handling banking failures and to provide mechanisms to give creditors and 
borrowers prompt and immediate access to their funds and lines of credit. 
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